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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to Utah 
Code Annotated §78A-4-103 (2)(j), as this case was transferred to the Court of Appeals 
from the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
A. Are the factual findings of the District Court legally insufficient for the Court to have 
entered a permanent stalking injunction against the Appellant? This Court will review 
the District Court's factual findings only for clear error. Haynes Land & Livestock v. 
Jocob Family Chalk Creek, 2010 UT App. 112. See also Wasatch County v. Okelberry, 
2008 UT 10, f 8,179 P.3d 768. 
B. Are the legal conclusions of the District Court, based upon its findings of fact, 
misconstrued and improperly applied when it granted the permanent stalking injunction 
against the Appellant? This Court will review the District Court's legal conclusions and 
interpretation and application of the relevant statute(s) for correctness." Houskeeper v. 
State, 2008 UT 78,1f 18, 197 P.3d 636 (Utah 2010). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Annotated §77-3a-101 
Utah Code Annotated §76-5-106.5 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This is an appeal from the District Court's Ruling and Order entering a permanent 
stalking injunction after evidentiary hearing held on the 22nd day of September, 2009. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Mr. Coombs and Mrs. Dietrich were married and had several children during their 
relationship. Appeal Record, P. 81: L.5-25. A Decree of Divorce was entered 
granting Mrs. Dietrich the physical custody and control of the remaining minor 
children. 
Mr. Coombs and Mrs. Dietrich were divorced in October of 2008 and Mrs. 
Dietrich subsequently married Brett Dietrich. Appeal Record, P. 81: L. 5-7. 
Mr. Coombs alleges that there were three (3) separate incidences which culminated 
in him filing for a stalking injunction against Mr. Dietrich; to wit: (1) December of 
2008, Appeal Record, P. 82: L. 9-22; December of 2008, one week after the 
alleged first incident, Appeal Record, P. 86: L. 8-12; and, May 22,2009, Appeal 
Record, P. 91: L. 7-15. 
Mr. Coombs requested and was granted a temporary stalking injunction on the 28th 
day of May, 2009. Appeal Record, P. 1 - 20 . 
Mr. Dietrich answered the allegations in the temporary stalking injunction and 
requested an evidentiary hearing. Appeal Record, P. 22 - 24. 
Mr. Coombs, Mr. Dietrich and other witnesses testified at the evidentiary hearing. 
Appeal Record, P. 76 -160. 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing the Court, the honorable Michael G. 
Allphin, upheld the temporary stalking injunction citing to the three (3) incidences 
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in which he found that Mr. Dietrich "interjected [himself] in situations where it 
was not called for" and where "[he] had absolutely no right to do so." Appeal 
Record, P. 161: L. 6 -12; P. 163: L. 2 - 3. 
8. The Court further stated that "there needs to be things put in place where it keeps 
you from interjecting yourself in anything other than the literal protection of your 
wife." Appeal Record, P. 163: L. 9 - 11. 
9. And, that the "stalking injunction probably is the only way, because you are not 
really a party to the divorce action, that I have in order to keep these petty things 
from continuing to happen. And I really think they are petty." Appeal Record, P. 
163: L. 20-24. 
10. Finally, the District Court concluded that, "... I think I can fit the things that have 
happened within the stalking injunction statute that, number one, I can find that 
you stayed physically, visually close to the petitioner in this case and made verbal 
threats and that were threatening or embarrassing to him. I think you did that on a 
number of occasions. That you knew or should have known that this kind of 
action would cause Mr. Coombs to be emotionally distressed and, particularly, the 
time when some of the kids were present, to cause them, a family member to be 
emotionally distressed. And so, I think there's just cause in issuing this just so that 
these kids can have an opportunity and a change in this life." Appeal Record, P. 
163 -164: L. 25, 1 -13. 
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11. The Court's Order from September 22,2009, was later entered in writing as an 
Order on Remand entered on the 16th day of April, 2010. Appeal Record, P. 69 -
75. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The District Court entered a permanent stalking injunction after hearing testimony 
regarding three (3) incidences involving Mr. Coombs and Mr. Dietrich. The Court found that 
Mr. Dietrich, on these three (3) incidences engaged in a course of conduct that caused Mr. 
Coombs to fear for his personal safety and/or suffer emotional distress. The Court found that 
Mr. Dietrich inappropriately interjected himself into issues regarding Mr. Coombs and his 
ex-wife, who is now married to Mr. Dietrich. 
The Court's findings are not supported by the testimony given at the evidentiary 
hearing and do not satisfy the definitions of "Stalking" as Mr. Dietrich did not engage in any 
"course of conduct" which either created Mr. Coombs to reasonably fear for his safety nor 
cause him "emotional distress" which is further defined as "significant mental or 
psychological suffering." 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TESTIMONY GIVEN AT THE HEARING WAS LEGALLY 
INSUFFICIENT FOR THE COURT TO FIND MR. DIETRICH COMMITTED 
THE OFFENSE OF "STALKING-" THEREFORE, THE COURT WAS IN 
ERROR BY ENTERING A PERMANENT STALKING INJUNCTION. 
a. Utah Code Expressly Provides the Elements Necessary for the 
District Court to find that "Stalking* has Occurred. 
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The District Court has the authority to enter an ex parte and permanent stalking 
injunction against any individual pursuant to Utah Code §77-3a-101, et seq.. Specifically: 
"[a]ny person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file a 
verified written petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged 
stalker with the district court in the district in which the petitioner or 
respondent resides or in which any of the events occurred." Utah Code §77-3a-
101(2). 
"As used in this chapter, 'stalking' means the crime of stalking as defined in 
Section 76-5-106.5." Utah Code §77-3a-101(l). 
Therefore, the critical finding by the District Court in entering any ex parte or permanent 
stalking injunction is whether there is sufficient evidence to find that "stalking" has occurred. 
Stalking, as defined is: 
A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a 
course of conduct directed at a specific person and knows or should know that 
the course of conduct would cause a reasonable person: 
(2) (a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or 
(b) to suffer other emotional distress. 
Utah Code §76-5-106.5(2). 
"Emotional distress" is then defined as "significant mental or psychological suffering,..." 
Utah Code §76-5-106.5(l)(d). Within the "stalking" definition, the District Court must also 
find from the evidence that a person engaged in "a course of conduct." As defined in the 
Utah Code, 
"Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific 
person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, 
surveils, threatens, or communicates to or about a person, or interferes 
with a person's property: 
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(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone 
else to engage in any of these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person; 
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer 
or coworkers; 
© appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or 
enters property owned, leased, or occupied by a person; 
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the 
purpose of obtaining or disseminating information about or 
communicating with the person to a member of the person's family or 
household, employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person; 
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, leased, 
or occupied by a person, or to the person's place of employment with 
the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or 
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any 
other electronic means to commit an act that is a part of 
the course of conduct. 
b. The Testimony Does Not Establish that Mr. Dietrich Engaged in a 
"Continuous Course of Conduct," Caused "Significant Mental or 
Psychological Suffering" or that Mr. Coombs "Feared" for his 
Own Safety. 
This Court has held that M[i]n order to challenge a court's factual findings, an appellant 
must first marshal all the evidence in support of the finding and then demonstrate that the 
evidence is legally insufficient to support the finding even when viewing it in a light most 
favorable to the court below." Chen v. Stewart, 100 P.3d 1177 (Utah 2004). 
In this case, the District Court found that Mr. Dietrich engaged in a course of conduct 
and cited to three (3) different incidences in so doing; to wit: (1) December of 2008, Appeal 
Record, P. 69 and 82: L. 9-22; (2) December of 2008, one week after the alleged first 
incident, Appeal Record, P. 69 and 86: L. 8-12; and, (3) May 22,2009, Appeal Record, P. 
-6-
70 and 91: L. 7-15. In citing these three incidences, the District Court concluded that Mr. 
Dietrich "caused [Mr. Coombs] to fear for his personal safety and/or suffer emotional 
distress,..." Appeal Record, P.69 - 70. 
As stated herein below, the testimony regarding these incidences, viewed in a light 
most favorable to the District Court, clearly does not show a reasonable fear by Mr. Coombs 
nor that he suffered any significant mental or psychological suffering. 
First Incident 
The evidence in the light most favorable to the Court regarding the first incident, is 
that Mr. Dietrich, at the request of his wife, went to Dairy Queen at a time when Mr. Coombs 
and Mrs. Dietrich were to discuss their monthly calendar regarding their children. Appeal 
Record, P. 81 - 82. Mr. Dietrich sat in a booth on the other side of the restaurant with his 
step-daughter, Heather, and ate ice cream during the "majority" of Mr. Coombs' and Mrs. 
Dietrich's meeting. Appeal Record, P. 82: L. 25; P. 83: L. 1 - 9. At some point during the 
meeting, after they finished discussing the children, Mr. Coombs began discussing the "stuff 
that needed to be divided up in the house" with Mrs. Dietrich. Appeal Record, P. 83: L. 8 -
10; P. 118 - 119: L. 17 - 25, 1 - 3. At that point, Mrs. Dietrich turned her back to Mr. 
Coombs, "said something" to Mr. Dietrich at which time he approached the table and said, 
"the meeting was over" and that "it was time to go." Appeal Record, P. 83: L. 10 -16. Mr. 
Coombs attempted to finish discussing the personal property issues with Mrs. Dietrich but 
Mr. Dietrich, without saying a word, got his wife up and walked out the door with her. 
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Appeal Record, P. 83: L. 17 - 25. At that point, Mr. Coombs testified that Mr. Dietrich "said 
something" and then put Mrs. Dietrich in the car, walked around to the driver's side and 
"made a comment to me." Appeal Record, P. 83: L. 24 - 25; P. 84: L. 1 - 3. Mr. Coombs 
testified that he wasn't sure what Mr. Dietrich said to him but that is was something "about 
I'm a porno king or something like that, something to that effect." Appeal Record, P. 84: L. 
4 - 7 . Mr. Coombs testified that in reaction to the "comment" that Mr. Dietrich made, he 
"wanted to say something, but [] didn't... [a]nd just got in [his] car and left" and that he was 
"upset about it" regarding the comments that were made. Appeal Record, P. 84: L. 8 -11; 
P. 85: L. 11-15. 
Considering all of the testimony of Mr. Coombs, viewed in the light most favorable 
to the Court, it is not reasonable to conclude that Mr. Dietrich engaged in any conduct that 
would put Mr. Coombs in reasonable fear for his safety or that would cause a reasonable 
person to suffer emotional distress. To the contrary, this incident was rather unremarkable 
and had very little involvement from Mr. Dietrich. 
When questioned about "emotional distress" regarding the alleged "porno king" 
comment, Mr. Coombs' testimony was that he "wanted to say something" and that he was 
"upset." Appeal Record, P. 84: L. 10; P. 84: L. 15. However, Mr. Coombs could not testify 
as to exactly what was said. Mr. Coombs may have been upset, but being "upset" or wanting 
to "say something" does not provide the evidence necessary for any court to conclude that 
there is "significant mental or psychological suffering" as required in the definition of 
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"emotional distress." 
Similarly, it is not reasonable for the Court to find that Mr. Dietrich acted in any 
physical way to threaten, attempt to threaten, intimidate or cause Mr. Coombs to fear for his 
personal safety. In fact, there is no testimony as to any such fear by Mr. Coombs. Under 
Cross examination, Mr. Coombs testified that Mr. Dietrich did not threaten him 'Verbally." 
Appeal Record, P. 112: L. 15 -17. 
In the first incident, Mr. Dietrich stayed away from the meeting between Mr. Coombs 
and Mrs. Dietrich and sat on the other side of the restaurant. Only when Mrs. Dietrich turned 
to him and said something did Mr. Dietrich approached their table, said the meeting was over 
and then escorted her from the Dairy Queen. This was not a confrontation nor a threat. Mr. 
Dietrich only became involved after the parties finished discussing the calendering for the 
children and when Mr. Coombs began discussing division of the personal property. Mrs. 
Dietrich could have left at any time and, when so gestured, Mr. Dietrich escorted her out. 
The fact that Mr. Coombs did not to discuss the division of personal property is not relevant 
other than once he began that discussion, Mrs. Dietrich wanted to leave. 
The Court, in its findings, made reference that the "comment" made by Mr. Dietrich 
was "in the presence of the petitioner's child." Appeal Record, P. 70. The Court's finding 
is clearly erroneous as there is no testimony from Mr. Coombs that his daughter heard 
anything regarding the alleged "comment." Finally, the Court also entered findings that Mr. 
Dietrich made comments that were "threatening, harassing and/or embarrassing to the 
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petitioner." Appeal Record, P. 72. In regard to this incident, there is no testimony that any 
comments by Mr. Dietrich, vague as they were, in any way were threatening, harassing or 
embarrassing. Finally, the Court entered findings that Mr. Dietrich "inappropriately asserted 
himself into the meeting and stated that it was over." Appeal Record, P. 70. This finding is 
erroneous as the purpose of the meeting was for Mr. Coombs and Mrs. Dietrich to discuss 
their calendaring for the children. Appeal Record, P. 81 -82: L. 23 - 25; 1 - 2. When that 
was done, the purpose of the meeting was done and Mrs. Dietrich was not compelled to 
discuss the personal property issues or stay at the restaurant any longer than she wanted. 
Second Incident 
The evidence in the light most favorable to the Court regarding the second incident, 
is that approximately one week after the first incident, a time was arranged for Mr. Coombs 
to go to the South Weber home of Mrs. Dietrich to retrieve his "stuff that she had placed in 
the garage. Appeal Record, P. 86: L. 12 - 23. Prior to going to the South Weber home, Mr. 
Coombs called the sheriffs department to "prevent any problems because [he] assumed [Mr. 
Dietrich] would be there." Appeal Record, P. 86 - 87: L. 24 - 25; 1 - 2. Mr. Coombs 
testified that he felt it necessary to call the sheriffs department "because of what had 
happened at, the incident at Dairy Queen, I felt there was going to be a problem again.55 
Appeal Record, P. 86: L. 23-25. Mr. Coombs was never specific in his testimony about the 
"problem55 at Dairy Queen. In addition to the sheriffs department officer, Mr. Coombs also 
brought with him his father and his brother-in-law. Appeal Record, P. 87: L. 3 - 9. Upon 
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arrival at the South Weber home, Mr. Coombs' entourage was four strong. 
Mr. Coombs knocked on the front door when he arrived at the home and was told by 
Mrs. Dietrich that she would open the garage door. Appeal Record, P. 87: L. 18 -19. Mr. 
Coombs began to gather his "stuff and in less than a minute, Mr. Dietrich walked in to the 
garage and asked Mr. Coombs "how [he] was doing" and that he was "there to make sure that 
[Mr. Coombs] didn't take anything that was not [his]." Appeal Record, P. 87: L. 23 - 25. 
Mr. Dietrich at that time knew that a sheriff and two other men were with Mr. Coombs. 
Appeal Record, P.87: L. 24 -25. Mr. Coombs told Mr. Dietrich to "stay back so [he] could 
get [his] stuff." Appeal Record, P. 88: L. 1 - 2. Instead of responding to Mr. Dietrich's 
pleasantries regarding how he was doing, Mr. Coombs inquired as to "what he was doing 
there" and that he "had no business being there." Appeal Record, P. 88: L. 2 - 4. Mr. 
Dietrich simply responded that he was there at the request of Mrs. Dietrich. Appeal Record, 
P. 88: L. 3 - 5. At this time, Mr. Dietrich and Mrs. Dietrich were simply boyfriend and 
girlfriend. Appeal Record, P. 88: L. 13 - 18. 
After telling Mr. Dietrich that he had no business being there, Mr. Coombs instructed 
the sheriff to "keep him at bay so [he] could get [his] stuff." Appeal Record, P. 88: L. 22 -
25. At this time, Mr. Dietrich had simply walked in to the garage, asked how Mr. Coombs 
was doing, and then responded to his questions as to why he was there. Mr. Coombs did not 
testify why Mr. Dietrich should be kept "at bay." In fact, Mr. Coombs testified that during 
this incident there was never any physical altercation or threats. Appeal Record, P. 80: L. 4 -
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6; P. 90: L. 2 - 4. And, regarding the Dairy Queen incident, Mr. Coombs testified that there 
was no physical altercation or threats. Instead, Mr. Coombs testified Mr. Dietrich's presence 
to be "a total distraction" and that he tried "ignoring him as much as [he] possibly could." 
Appeal Record, P. 89: L. 12; P. 90: L. 2 - 4. Mr. Coombs felt that Mr. Dietrich was "egging 
[him] on to threaten him... call [him] a bunch of names and stuff like that." Appeal Record, 
P. 89: L. 9 - 14. Mr. Coombs also testified that Mr. Dietrich said "something about pom 
again. [He] was a porn king or something to that effect." Appeal Record, P. 89: L. 17 -19. 
Again, in response, Mr. Coombs "just kind of ignored him." Appeal Record, P. 89: L. 19 -
20. Finally, without being specific, Mr. Coombs testified that whatever comments Mr. 
Dietrich made, they were "insulting" to him. Appeal Record, P. 91: L. 5 - 6. 
Once Mr. Coombs was done getting "all of the stuff our of the garage" he wanted to 
go in to the home to take pictures of the other items which had not been divided. Appeal 
Record, P, 90: L. 11 - 14. Mr. Coombs told the sheriff that he wanted to go in to the home 
and Mrs. and Mr. Dietrich stopped him and said he was "not allowed to go in." Appeal 
Record, P. 90: L. 16 -19. The sheriff correctly told Mr. Coombs he could not go in the home 
and he left the residence. 
On this second incident, there is no testimony for the District Court to find that Mr. 
Dietrich's actions, in any way, were "threatening" to Mr. Coombs whereby he reasonably 
feared for his own safety. In fact, it would be unreasonable for Mr. Coombs to fear for his 
safety when he arrived at the South Weber home with a sheriffs officer and two other men. 
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Similarly, there is no testimony that Mr. Dietrich or Mr. Coombs were physical in any 
respect. Mr. Coombs may have felt that Mr. Dietrich was annoying, or "insulting/9 and that 
he had "no business being there/' but the facts and testimony are clear, there were no threats, 
no physical altercation or any course of conduct, during this incident or the first incident, for 
the District Court to conclude that Mr. Dietrich engaged in conduct that made Mr. Coombs 
reasonably fear for his safety. 
The District Court has also used the term "harassing" in its findings regarding 
comments made by Mr. Dietrich. Appeal Record, P. 71. The term "harassing" is misplaced 
by the District Court as any alleged "harassing" comments are not contemplated in the Utah 
Code under the "Course of Conduct," "Emotional Distress" or "Stalking" definitions in §76-
5-106.5. And, under direct and cross-examination, Mr. Coombs did not testify as to any 
"significant or psychological suffering." Instead, Mr. Coombs' testimony clearly establishes 
that he was annoyed, felt insulted, was distracted and that he did his best to ignore Mr. 
Dietrich. Appeal Record, P. 89 - 90. 
Ultimately, Mr. Coombs voluntarily went to the South Weber home to retrieve items 
specifically left for him in the garage. Mrs. Dietrich emailed Mr. Coombs and told him to 
get a "pile of [his] stuff at the house in the garage, and that he need to come pick it up." 
Appeal Record, P. 86: L. 17 - 21. Mr. Coombs arrived at the home with a sheriffs officer, 
his father and brother-in-law, collected those things placed for him, then left. Nothing more. 
The fact that Mr. Dietrich was at the home to make sure Mr. Coombs did not take more than 
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what was left for him, although annoying to Mr. Coombs, is not a course of conduct that 
either caused Mr. Coombs to fear for his safety or for him to suffer significant mental or 
psychological suffering. 
Third Incident 
The evidence in the light most favorable to the Court regarding the third incident 
occurred approximately six (6) months later on May 22,2009, when Mr. Coombs once again 
went to the South Weber home. Appeal Record, P. 91: L. 7 -17. On this occasion, pursuant 
to the Decree of Divorce, Mr. Coombs testified that he was there to "pick up the children." 
Appeal Record, P. 91: L. 18 -19. In addition, Mr. Coombs testified that he had just registered 
his son's car and he was there to put the temporary sticker in the back "so he could drive for 
the weekend, so my kids could use the car for the weekend." Appeal Record, P. 91: L. 18 -
22. The car was registered to Mr. Coombs5 19 year old son and was purchased by he and 
Mrs. Dietrich. Appeal Record, P. 91 - 92: L. 23- 25; 1 - 6. Mr. Coombs also knew prior to 
going to the South Weber home that the car battery was dead and that he was going to 
"charge the battery up so we could drive it off." Appeal Record, P. 92: L. 12 -13. 
Shortly after Mr. Coombs arrived at the house his son retrieved the car keys, they 
started to charge the car and Mr. Coombs was looking for tape to place the temporary 
registration. Appeal Record, P. 92: L. 13 -16. At some time, Mr. Dietrich approached Mr. 
Coombs and asked him "who the car was registered to." Appeal Record, P. 92: L. 20 - 21. 
Mr. Coombs then testified that Mr. Dietrich grabbed the paperwork from him, out of his 
.14. 
hands, and then grabbed the car keys from the door lock when he went to get in the car. 
Appeal Record, P. 92: L. 23 - 25. Despite the greater size and weight advantage of Mr. 
Coombs, he testified that Mr. Dietrich "pushed [him] against the car,95 kept "pushing the door 
shut" and that "he slammed [his] arm in the door as [he] tried to open it.5' Appeal Record, 
P. 93: L. 1 - 7. At some point, Mr. Coombs jumped in to the front passenger side and Mr. 
Dietrich got in the car with him. Appeal Record, P. 93: L. 7 - 8. During this interaction, Mr. 
Dietrich kept asking that Mrs. Dietrich "wanted to know who the car was registered in." 
Appeal Record, P. 93: L. 10 - 11. Although the testimony is unclear, at some point, Mr. 
Coombs stated that Mr. Dietrich told him he was "going to take [him] down." Appeal 
Record, P. 93: L. 13 -16. And, at some point, the car keys and paperwork were taken from 
Mr. Coombs. Appeal Record, P. 93: L. 15 - 24. The altercation between Mr. Coombs and 
Mr. Dietrich eventually ended when officers from the sheriffs department arrived and both 
men were cited for simple assault. Appeal Record, P. 94: L. 3 - 4. Finally, Mr. Coombs 
testified that the altercation was emotionally distressing because it happened "right in front 
of my kids" and that it was "insulting." Appeal Record, P. 94 - 94: L. 23 - 25; 1 - 3. 
On May 22,2009, it had been six (6) months since the prior two incidences described 
above. And, based upon Mr. Coombs' sworn testimony, the prior two incidences did not 
involve any verbal or physical threats or describe any continuous conduct by Mr. Dietrich 
that created any reasonable fear for Mr. Coombs' safety. In fact, other than this third 
incident, there have been no other physical or verbal threats. That testimony is undisputed 
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and clear. 
The Court can reasonably surmise that Mr. Coombs did not fear for his safety on May 
22, because he went to the home alone, after the other two incidences, knowing that he 
would be at the residence for some time. Mr. Coombs was not at the residence to simply pick 
up the children. He knew he would be at the residence for a while because the battery was 
"dead in the car, so [he] wanted to charge the battery up so we could drive it off." Appeal 
Record, P. 92: L. 11-13. 
Considering all of Mr. Coombs' testimony, it is undeniable that this third incident is 
in fact the first, and only, incident in which there has been physical contact, threats and 
emotional distress that arguably satisfies those definitions of the stalking injunction statute. 
In this incident, both Mr. Coombs and Mr. Dietrich were active participants and made 
threats, barbs and inflicted some type of physical injury on the other. Appeal Record, P. 143: 
L. 13 - 16. Although Mr. Coombs said he was "pushed"against the car, that Mr. Dietrich 
kept "pushing the door shut" and that the car door was "slammed" on his arm, it was Mr. 
Coombs that "took his open hand and struck" Mr. Dietrich in the face. Appeal Record, P. 
93: L. 1 - 7; P. 142: L. 8 - 9. Mr. Coombs also taunted Mr. Dietrich by calling him a 
"Chihuahua" and that he was "all talk and no action." Appeal Record, P. 124: L. 3 - 5. As 
a result of their conduct, both men were properly charged with assault and, since May of 
2009, there have been no other incidences. 
By strictly reviewing the definitions in Utah Code §76-5-106.5(1 )(b), (d) and (f), these 
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incidences do not satisfy the definition of a "Course of Conduct" engaged in by Mr. Dietrich. 
Specifically, there has been no testimony of "two or more" acts that were directed at Mr. 
Coombs in which he was being monitored, followed, observed, photographed, surveiled, 
threatened or communicated with that either created reasonable fear for safety or for Mr. 
Coombs to suffer emotional distress which is "significant mental or psychological suffering." 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Dietrich seeks a reversal of the District Court's entry of a permanent stalking 
injunction and remand for the entry of an order dismissing the injunction. 
./'%/& 
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prepaid, in the United States mail, addressed to the following: 
Reuben C. Renstrom 
1412 South Legend Hills Drive, Ste. 310 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
DANIEL S. DRAGE 
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SECOND 
P1STRICT COURT 
IN THE SECOND DISTRICT COURT, DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
BLAKE D. COOMBS, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
BRETT A. DIETRICH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON REMAND 
Case No. 090700403 
Judge Michael G. Allphin 
This matter is before the Court on remand from the Utah Court of Appeals, "for entry of a 
final order, signed by the court and filed with the clerk, memorializing the oral ruling that 
continued and modified the Temporary Civil Stalking Injunction." Coombs v. Dietrich, Case No. 
20090924-CA, pg. 3. Having reviewed the Utah Court of Appeals order for remand, along with 
the reporter's transcript of the September 22, 2009 evidentiary hearing regarding civil stalking 
injunction in this matter and the Court's case file, and being fully advised in the premises, the 
Court makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order on civil stalking 
injunction: 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That on at least three (3) separate occasions the respondent has intentionally and 
inappropriately interjected himself into situations involving the petitioner and his ex-wife and 
children, wherein the respondent caused the petitioner to fear for his personal safety and/or suffer 
emotional distress, and that the respondent knew or should have known that his conduct would 
cause this result in the petitioner and/or a reasonable person. 
2. That mqjirst occasion of the respondent's inappropriate course of conduct 
directed at the petitioner occurred on or about December 6, 2008, at the Dairy Queen restaurant 
on Highway 193, wherein the respondent interrupted a court-ordered meeting between the 
petitioner and his ex-wife regarding issues pertaining to their divorce. 
3. That during this court-ordered meeting, the respondent inappropriately asserted 
himself into the meeting and stated that it was over. 
4. That after interrupting this court-ordered meeting, the respondent made 
disparaging and/or negative comments regarding the petitioner, calling him among other things a 
"Porno King," in the presence of the petitioner's child. 
5. That the Sii&onji-etcasion of the respondent's inappropriate course of conduct 
directed at the petitioner occurred approximately one (1) week after the first incident, in 
December 2008, at the petitioner's and his ex-wife's marital residence in South Weber, wherein 
the respondent interjected himself and inhibited the petitioner from retrieving certain personal 
property left at the residence by the petitioner's ex-wife. 
6. That the respondent had no right to prevent and/or inhibit the petitioner from 
retrieving his personal property from the residence, or to interrupt the petitioner from taking 
pictures of other property within the residence's garage that the petitioner believed to belong to 
him, particularly in light of the fact that the petitioner had requested the presence of a police 
officer to oversee the matter and ensure that order was maintained and that there would not be a 
confrontation with the respondent and/or the petitioner's ex-wife. 
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7. That while the petitioner attempted to retrieve his personal property from the 
residence, the respondent made threatening and/or harassing comments directed at the petitioner, 
while in the presence of others and in an attempt to provoke an altercation with the petitioner. 
8. That while the petitioner attempted to collect his personal property from the 
residence, the respondent made insulting comments directed at the petitioner, including again 
calling the petitioner a "Porno King," while in the presence of others and in an attempt to 
provoke an altercation with the petitioner. 
9. That the rhiri$)ccasion of the respondent's inappropriate course of conduct 
directed at the petitioner occurred on or about May 22, 2010, at the petitioner's and his ex-wife's 
marital residence in South Weber, wherein the respondent interjected himself into a situation 
involving the petitioner placing a temporary registration on his son's vehicle during a visitation 
pick-up. 
10. That the respondent had no right to interject himself into the petitioner's visitation 
pick-up and matters involving the petitioner and his son's vehicle. 
11. That during this visitation pick-up and while in the presence of the petitioner's 
son, the respondent forcibly took the keys to the petitioner's son's vehicle and the vehicle's 
registration paperwork from the petitioner. 
12. That during this visitation pick-up and while in the presence of the petitioner's 
son, the respondent pushed the petitioner against the vehicle and shut the vehicle's door on the 
petitioner's arm. 
13. That during this visitation pick-up and while in the presence of the petitioner's 
son, the respondent made disparaging and/or threatening comments directed at the petitioner. 
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14. That based upon the respondent's course of conduct directed at the petitioner 
during these three (3) occasions and to prevent further incidents, a civil stalking injunction must 
be implemented to prevent the respondent from interjecting himself into situations involving the 
petitioner and his ex-wife and children that the respondent has no right to be involved in, except 
for the literal protection of the respondent's wife. 
15. That based upon the attempts to make the petitioner pick-up his children 
individually for his visitation and at various locations, the respondent and/or the petitioner's ex-
wife are trying to make the petitioner jump through unnecessary and unreasonable hoops with 
regard to his visitation with his children. 
16. That based upon the aforementioned three (3) incidences, the respondent has 
stayed physically and visually close to the petitioner and made verbal statements that were 
threatening, harassing and/or embarrassing to the petitioner. 
17. That based upon the respondent's course of conduct, the petitioner has reasonably 
felt fear for his personal safety and has suffered emotional distress. 
18. That the respondent knew or should have known that his course of conduct would 
cause a reasonable person, and the petitioner, to fear for the person's safety and to suffer 
emotional distressed. 
19. That the emotional distress suffered by the petitioner due to the respondent's 
course of conduct is particularly harmful considering that the respondent's threatening, harassing 
and/or embarrassing comments occurred while in the presence of the petitioner's children. 
20. That the respondent's involvement in the aforementioned three (3) incidents was 
at the request of the petitioner's ex-wife is of no consequence, as the respondent had no right to 
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become involved in the issues pertaining to the petitioner's divorce from his ex-wife, retrieval of 
the petitioner's personal property, and the petitioner's visitation with his children. 
21.. That the petitioner believes that the respondent's course of conduct, which has 
reasonably caused fear for his personal safety and emotional distress, will continue into the 
future. 
22. That absent the imposition of a civil stalking injunction against the respondent, 
the respondent's course of conduct, which has reasonably caused fear for the petitioner's 
personal safety and emotional distress, will continue into the future. 
23. That a civil stalking injunction is the only vehicle and/or method of keeping 
things civil among the parties and away from each other. 
24. That just cause exists for the issuance of a civil stalking injunction against the 
respondent in this matter. 
ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, IT IS HEREBY 
ORDERED that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-3a-101(ll)(a) (2008), the ex parte temporary 
civil stalking injunction issued on May 28, 2009, in this matter shall continue in force and effect 
for a period of three (3) years from the date of its service on the respondent. May 29, 2009, 
subject to the following modifications: 
1. that the respondent shall not contact, phone, mail, e-mail, or otherwise 
communicate in any way with the petitioner, and the respondent shall not 
make any disparaging or negative comments about the petitioner to or in 
the presence of the petitioner's children; 
2. that the respondent shall not interject himself into matters between the 
petitioner and his ex-wife concerning issues of property disposition, child 
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support payments, alimony payments or visitation with the petitioner's 
children; 
3. that, with the exception of functions and/or activities involving the 
petitioner's children, the respondent shall leave any public place where the 
petitioner is present; and 
4. that at all times during functions and/or activities involving the petitioner's 
children, the respondent shall stay at least fifty (50) feet away from the 
petitioner. 
This Order shall constitute the Court's final order and judgment in this matter. 
ATTENTION. THIS IS AN OFFICIAL COURT ORDER. IF YOU 
DISOBEY THIS ORDER, THE COURT MAY FIND YOU IN CONTEMPT, 
YOU MAY ALSO BE ARRESTED AND PROSECUTED FOR THE 
CRIME OF STALKING AND ANY OTHER CRIME YOU MAY HAVE 
COMMITTED IN DISOBEYING THIS ORDER. 
Date signed: ^ ' //^ rfQ 
MICHAEL 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I certify that I sent a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER ON REMAND 
postage pre-paid, to the following on this date: _T iy is. 
Michael J. Boyle 
Daniel S. Drage 
BOYLE & DRAGE PC 
2506 Madison Avenue 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Kyle Hoskins 
1916 North 700 West, Suite 220 
Layton, Utah 84041-0003 
Reuben J. Renstrom 
HELGESON WATERFALL & JONES PC 
1412 South Legend Hills Drive, Suite 310 
Clearfield, Utah 84015 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
P.O. Box 140230 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0230 
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Titie/Chapter/Section: Go To 
Utah Code 
Title 77 Utah Code of Criminal Procedure 
Chapter 3a Stalking Injunctions 
Section 101 Civil stalking injunction - Petition — Ex parte injunction. 
77-3a-101. Civil stalking injunction — Petition — Ex parte injunction. 
(1) As used in this chapter, "stalking" means the crime of stalking as defined in Section 76-5-106.5. 
Stalking injunctions may not be obtained against law enforcement officers, governmental investigators, 
or licensed private investigators, acting in their official capacity. 
(2) Any person who believes that he or she is the victim of stalking may file a verified written 
petition for a civil stalking injunction against the alleged stalker with the district court in the district in 
which the petitioner or respondent resides or in which any of the events occurred. A minor with his or 
her parent or guardian may file a petition on his or her own behalf, or a parent, guardian, or custodian 
may file a petition on the minor's behalf. 
(3) The Administrative Office of the Courts shall develop and adopt uniform forms for petitions, ex 
parte civil stalking injunctions, civil stalking injunctions, service and any other necessary forms in 
accordance with the provisions of this chapter on or before July 1,2001. The office shall provide the 
forms to the clerk of each district court. 
(a) All petitions, injunctions, ex parte injunctions, and any other necessary forms shall be issued in 
the form adopted by the Administrative Office of the Courts. 
(b) The offices of the court clerk shall provide the forms to persons seeking to proceed under this 
chapter. 
(4) The petition for a civil stalking injunction shall include: 
(a) the name of the petitioner; however, the petitioner's address shall be disclosed to the court for 
purposes of service, but, on request of the petitioner, the address may not be listed on the petition, and 
shall be protected and maintained in a separate document or automated database, not subject to release, 
disclosure, or any form of public access except as ordered by the court for good cause shown; 
(b) the name and address, if known, of the respondent; 
(c) specific events and dates of the actions constituting the alleged stalking; 
(d) if there is a prior court order concerning the same conduct, the name of the court in which the 
order was rendered; and 
(e) corroborating evidence of stalking, which may be in the form of a police report, affidavit, record, 
statement, item, letter, or any other evidence which tends to prove the allegation of stalking. 
(5) If the court determines that there is reason to believe that an offense of stalking has occurred, an 
ex parte civil stalking injunction may be issued by the court that includes any of the following: 
(a) respondent may be enjoined from committing stalking; 
(b) respondent may be restrained from coming near the residence, place of employment, or school of 
the other party or specifically designated locations or persons; 
(c) respondent may be restrained from contacting, directly or indirectly, the other party, including 
personal, written or telephone contact with the other party, the other party's employers, employees, 
fellow workers or others with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the 
other party; or 
(d) any other relief necessary or convenient for the protection of the petitioner and other specifically 
designated persons under the circumstances. 
(6) Within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the respondent is entitled to 
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request, in writing, an evidentiary hearing on the civil stalking injunction. 
(a) A hearing requested by the respondent shall be held within 10 days from the date the 
request is filed with the court unless the court finds compelling reasons to continue the hearing. The 
hearing shall then be held at the earliest possible time. The burden is on the petitioner to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent has occurred. 
(b) An ex parte civil stalking injunction issued under this section shall state on its face: 
(i) that the respondent is entitled to a hearing, upon written request within 10 days of the service of 
the order; 
(ii) the name and address of the district court where the request may be filed; 
(iii) that if the respondent fails to request a hearing within 10 days of service, the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction is automatically modified to a civil stalking injunction without further notice to the 
respondent and that the civil stalking injunction expires three years after service of the ex parte civil 
stalking injunction; and 
(iv) that if the respondent requests, in writing, a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the 
court shall set a hearing within a reasonable time from the date requested. 
(7) At the hearing, the court may modify, revoke, or continue the injunction. The burden is on the 
petitioner to show by a preponderance of the evidence that stalking of the petitioner by the respondent 
has occurred. 
(8) The ex parte civil stalking injunction and civil stalking injunction shall include the following 
statement: "Attention. This is an official court order. If you disobey this order, the court may find you in 
contempt. You may also be arrested and prosecuted for the crime of stalking and any other crime you 
may have committed in disobeying this order." 
(9) The ex parte civil stalking injunction shall be served on the respondent within 90 days from the 
date it is signed. An ex parte civil stalking injunction is effective upon service. If no hearing is requested 
in writing by the respondent within 10 days of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction, the ex 
parte civil stalking injunction automatically becomes a civil stalking injunction without further notice to 
the respondent and expires three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction. 
(10) If the respondent requests a hearing after the ten-day period after service, the court shall set a 
hearing within a reasonable time from the date requested. At the hearing, the burden is on the respondent 
to show good cause why the civil stalking injunction should be dissolved or modified. 
(11) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, excluding 
weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court from which the ex parte civil stalking injunction was 
issued shall enter a copy of the ex parte civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of 
service in the statewide network for warrants or a similar system. 
(a) The effectiveness of an ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction shall not 
depend upon its entry in the statewide system and, for enforcement purposes, a certified copy of an ex 
parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction is presumed to be a valid existing order of the 
court for a period of three years from the date of service of the ex parte civil stalking injunction on the 
respondent. 
(b) Any changes or modifications of the ex parte civil stalking injunction are effective upon service 
on the respondent. The original ex parte civil stalking injunction continues in effect until service of the 
changed or modified civil stalking injunction on the respondent. 
(12) Within 24 hours after the affidavit or acceptance of service has been returned, excluding 
weekends and holidays, the clerk of the court shall enter a copy of the changed or 
modified civil stalking injunction and proof of service or acceptance of service in the statewide network 
for warrants or a similar system. 
(13) The ex parte civil stalking injunction or civil stalking injunction may be dissolved at any time 
upon application of the petitioner to the court which granted it. 
(14) The court clerk shall provide, without charge, to the petitioner one certified copy of the 
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injunction issued by the court and one certified copy of the proof of service of the injunction on the 
respondent. Charges may be imposed by the clerk's office for any additional copies, certified or not 
certified in accordance with Rule 4-202.08 of the Code of Judicial Administration. 
(15) The remedies provided in this chapter for enforcement of the orders of the court are in addition 
to any other civil and criminal remedies available. The district court shall hear and decide all matters 
arising pursuant to this section. 
(16) After a hearing with notice to the afifected party, the court may enter an order requiring any party 
to pay the costs of the action, including reasonable attorney fees. 
(17) This chapter does not apply to protective orders or ex parte protective orders issued pursuant to 
Title 78B, Chapter 7, Part 1, Cohabitant Abuse Act, or to preliminary injunctions issued pursuant to an 
action for dissolution of marriage or legal separation. 
Amended by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session 
Download Code Section Zipped WordPerfect 77 03a010100.ZIP 5,312 Bytes 
« Previous Section (77-3-12) Next Section (77-3a-102) » 
Questions/Comments [ Utah State Home Page 1 Terms of Use/Privacy Policy 
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Utah Code 
Title 76 Utah Criminal Code 
Chapter 5 Offenses Against the Person 
Section 106.5 Stalking — Definitions — Injunction — Penalties. 
76-5-106.5. Stalking — Definitions — Injunction — Penalties. 
(1) As used in this section: 
(a) "Conviction" means: 
(i) a verdict or conviction; 
(ii) a plea of guilty or guilty and mentally ill; 
(iii) a plea of no contest; or 
(iv) the acceptance by the court of a plea in abeyance. 
(b) "Course of conduct" means two or more acts directed at or toward a specific person, including: 
(i) acts in which the actor follows, monitors, observes, photographs, surveils, threatens, or 
communicates to or about a person, or interferes with a person's property: 
(A) directly, indirectly, or through any third party; and 
(B) by any action, method, device, or means; or 
(ii) when the actor engages in any of the following acts or causes someone else to engage in any of 
these acts: 
(A) approaches or confronts a person; 
(B) appears at the person's workplace or contacts the person's employer or coworkers; 
(C) appears at a person's residence or contacts a person's neighbors, or enters property owned, leased, 
or occupied by a person; 
(D) sends material by any means to the person or for the purpose of obtaining or disseminating 
information about or communicating with the person to a member of the person's family or household, 
employer, coworker, friend, or associate of the person; 
(E) places an object on or delivers an object to property owned, leased, or occupied by a person, or to 
the person's place of employment with the intent that the object be delivered to the person; or 
(F) uses a computer, the Internet, text messaging, or any other electronic means to commit an act that 
is a part of the course of conduct. 
(c) "Immediate family" means a spouse, parent, child, sibling, or any other person who regularly 
resides in the household or who regularly resided in the household within the prior six months. 
(d) "Emotional distress" means significant mental or psychological suffering, whether or not medical 
or other professional treatment or counseling is required. 
(e) "Reasonable person" means a reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. 
(f) "Stalking" means an offense as described in Subsection (2) or (3). 
(g) "Text messaging" means a communication in the form of electronic text or one or more electronic 
images sent by the actor from a telephone or computer to another person's telephone or computer by 
addressing the communication to the recipient's telephone number. 
(2) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly engages in a course of conduct 
directed at a specific person and knows or should know that the course of conduct would cause a 
reasonable person: 
(a) to fear for the person's own safety or the safety of a third person; or 
(b) to suffer other emotional distress. 
(3) A person is guilty of stalking who intentionally or knowingly violates: 
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(a) a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking Injunctions; or 
(b) a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section. 
(4) In any prosecution under this section, it is not a defense that the actor: 
(a) was not given actual notice that the course of conduct was unwanted; or 
(b) did not intend to cause the victim fear or other emotional distress. 
(5) An offense of staLking may be prosecuted under this section in any jurisdiction where one or more 
of the acts that is part of the course of conduct was initiated or caused an effect on the victim 
(6) Stalking is a class A misdemeanor: 
(a) upon the offender^ first violation of Subsection (2); or 
(b) if the offender violated a stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, Stalking 
Injunctions. 
(7) Stalking is a third degree felony if the offender: 
(a) has been previously convicted of an offense of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted in another jurisdiction of an offense that is substantially similar to 
the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been previously convicted of any felony offense in Utah or of any crime in another 
jurisdiction which if committed in Utah would be a felony, in which the victim of the stalking offense or 
a member of the victim's immediate family was also a victim of the previous felony offense; 
(d) violated a permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to Subsection (9); or 
(e) has been or is at the time of the offense a cohabitant, as defined in Section 78B-7-102, of the 
victim. 
(8) Stalking is a second degree felony if the offender: 
(a) used a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or used other means or force likely to 
produce death or serious bodily injury, in the commission of the crime of stalking; 
(b) has been previously convicted two or more times of the offense of stalking; 
(c) has been convicted two or more times in another jurisdiction or jurisdictions of offenses that are 
substantially similar to the offense of stalking; 
(d) has been convicted two or more times, in any combination, of offenses under Subsection (7)(a), 
(b),or(c); 
(e) has been previously convicted two or more times of felony offenses in Utah or of crimes in 
another jurisdiction or jurisdictions which, if committed in Utah, would be felonies, in which the victim 
of the stalking was also a victim of the previous felony offenses; or 
(f) has been previously convicted of an offense under Subsection (7)(d), (e), or (f). 
(9) (a) A conviction for stalking or a plea accepted by the court and held in abeyance for a period of 
time serves as an application for a permanent criminal stalking injunction limiting the contact between 
the defendant and the victim. 
(b) A permanent criminal stalking injunction shall be issued by the court without a hearing unless the 
defendant requests a hearing at the time of the conviction. The court shall give the defendant notice of 
the right to request a hearing. 
(c) If the defendant requests a hearing under Subsection (9)(b), it shall be held at the lime of flic 
conviction unless the victim requests otherwise, or for good cause. 
(d) If the conviction was entered in a justice court, a certified copy of the judgment and conviction or 
a certified copy of the court's order holding the plea in abeyance must be filed by the victim in the 
district court as an application and request for a hearing for a permanent 
criminal stalking injunction. 
(10) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may grant the following relief: 
(a) an order: 
(i) restraining the defendant from entering the residence, property, school, or place of employment of 
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the victim; and 
(ii) requiring the defendant to stay away from the victim and members of the victim's immediate 
family or household and to stay away from any specified place that is named in the order and is 
frequented regularly by the victim; and 
(b) an order restraining the defendant from making contact with or regarding the victim, including an 
order forbidding the defendant from personally or through an agent initiating any communication likely 
to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim, including personal, written, or telephone contact with or 
regarding the victim, with the victim's employers, employees, coworkers, friends, associates, or others 
with whom communication would be likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim 
(11) A permanent criminal stalking injunction may be dissolved or dismissed only upon application 
of the victim to the court which granted the injunction. 
(12) Notice of permanent criminal stalking injunctions issued pursuant to this section shall be sent by 
the court to the statewide warrants network or similar system. 
(13) A permanent criminal stalking injunction issued pursuant to this section has effect statewide. 
(14) (a) Violation of an injunction issued pursuant to this section constitutes a third degree felony 
offense of stalking under Subsection (7). 
(b) Violations may be enforced in a civil action initiated by the stalking victim, a criminal action 
initiated by a prosecuting attorney, or both. 
(15) This section does not preclude the filing of a criminal information for stalking based on the same 
act which is the basis for the violation of the stalking injunction issued pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 3a, 
Stalking Injunctions, or a permanent criminal stalking injunction. 
Amended by Chapter 356, 2008 General Session 
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